Johnson, James Weldon Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Johnson, James Weldon - Research Paper Example A major chunk of the works highlighted in this historical overview was taken from the segment regarding James Weldon Johnson. There was some information that was skipped mostly because it was irrelevant and shifted focus from Johnson’s main work. The main concentration was on many of his great poems as well as pieces of his works. This site consists of a lot of information about James Weldon Johnson’s life, his work and how passionate he was about poetry as well as music. The core focus however is on his work which is creatively displayed and depicted through the colorful use of making various quotes, summaries and key phrases out of his work; for example, ‘The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man an God’s Trombones’. This makes his poetry and literature all the more attractive and easily to go through for viewers. This website focuses on the biography and providing the detailed work of James Weldon Johnson. It is structured and organized in the way that it displays a great list of a wide selection of his work which is displayed categorized by the year in which It was published. Furthermore it includes the may awards and honors that were presented to Johnson during his lifetime and several that were named for him after he had passed away. Douglas, A. and Buckles, C. (2011). Documenting the American South. University Library.  God’s Trombones: Seven Negro Sermons in Verse Electronic Edition. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The unique thing about this source was the fact that it showed representations of the actual work of James Weldon Johnson. There were a lot pictures that were scanned from his actual book which gave the reader a very real idea of what his work was really like in its original form. Furthermore there were several links that aimed to enhance ones study into topics like southern history, literature as well as culture. Johnson played a major part in the

BHS 411 &#8211 Issues of Terrorism Mod 4 SLP Essay

BHS 411 – Issues of Terrorism Mod 4 SLP - Essay Example According to White (2006), the FBI is loosely linked to all America's law enforcement agencies (p. 4). However, many federal law enforcement agencies and local police executives openly resent or do not trust the FBI (White, 2006, p. 4). Most of all, "there is no system to sift, sanitize, and disseminate information to local law enforcement" (White, 2006, p. 4). These are very good points why the FBI is a vulnerable subject to cyber attacks. To launch the attack, I will first design a web log where people who have "bad encounters" or negative criticisms with the FBI can post their blogs. This will be a sort of "character assassination" that can stir emotions against the FBI, and perhaps, loose confidence to this agency. The end result will be a weaker coordination by the American people in providing information for the FBI, thus, will make it so much difficult for the agents to gather evidences and information on terrorist activities. I will also devise a sp

EMPLOYMENT AND DISCRIMINATION LAW 2009-10 Essay

EMPLOYMENT AND DISCRIMINATION LAW 2009-10 - Essay Example The test for less favourable treatment is clearly an objective one and the question that is to be asked is whether the complainant would have been treated differently more favourably had it not been for his sex. Thus, the tribunal must ask what the ‘conscious or subconscious reason for treating the claimant less favourably was’ (Nagarajan v. London Regional Transport)1. The decision of less favourable treatment is for the tribunal to decide and it is not a difficult one. In order to determine less favourable treatment, a comparison with an actual or hypothetical comparator is to be made, however it is necessary that the relevant circumstances of the complainant and the comparative group are same or not materially different. Thus, in Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary2, it was stated that From s.63A and Igen v Wong3 it is clear that the evidential burden to show facts from which Employment Tribunal can conclude that the employer has committed an act of discrimination and if such burden is met then the legal burden shifts to the employer who has to show that the reason for the treatment was not related in any way with claimant’s sex. Thus, if an inadequate explanation is provided the Employment Tribunal must fina that the employer committed an act of unlawful discrimination. In the current scenario it is quite evident that Graham has received less favourable treatment on the ground of his sex and this is clear from what has been said by IRU in their reason for rejecting Graham. Furthermore, if a hypothetical comparator is drawn then in the same circumstances a woman would have received more favourable treatment and thus direct discrimination is established. The remedies that might be available to Graham are a recommendation that IRU should take action so as to reduce the effect of the discrimination. Further, he could receive compensation which could include pecuniary losses if any and injury to feelings. For the

International Trade and Comparative Advantage Essay Example for Free

International Trade and Comparative Advantage Essay ? In spite of the strong theoretical case that can be made for free international trade, every country in the world has erected at least some barriers to trade. Trade restrictions are typically undertaken in an effort to protect companies and workers in the home economy from competition by foreign firms. A protectionist policy is one in which a country restricts the importation of goods and services produced in foreign countries. The India, for example, uses protectionist policies to limit the quantity of foreign- produced sugar coming into country. In general, protectionist policies imposed for a particular good always reduce its supply, raise its price, and reduce the equilibrium quantity. Protection often takes the form of an import tax or a limit on the amount that can be imported, but it can also come in the form of voluntary export restrictions and other barriers. Tariff rates on dutiable imports have fallen dramatically over the course of history. A tariff is a tax on imported goods and services. A tariff raises the cost of selling imported goods. It thus shifts the supply curve for goods to the left. The price of the protected good rises and the quantity available to consumers falls. Protectionist policies reduce the quantities of foreign goods and services supplied to the country that imposes the restriction. As a result, such policies shift the supply curve to the left for the good or service whose imports are restricted. In the case shown, the supply curve shifts to S2, the equilibrium price rises to P2, and the equilibrium quantity falls to Q2. One of the most common protectionist measures now in use is the antidumping proceeding. A domestic firm, faced with competition by a foreign competitor, files charges with its government that the foreign firm is dumping, or charging an unfair price. Under rules spelled out in international negotiations that preceded approval of the World Trade Organization, an unfair price was defined as a price below production cost or below the price the foreign firm charges for the same good in its own country. While these definitions may seem straightforward enough, they have proven to be quite troublesome. A quota is a direct restriction on the total quantity of a good or service that may be imported during a specified period. Quotas restrict total supply and therefore increase the domestic price of the good or service on which they are imposed. Quotas generally specify that an exporting countrys share of a domestic market may not exceed a certain limit. In some cases, quotas are set to raise the domestic price to a particular level. A quota restricting the quantity of a particular good imported into an economy shifts the supply curve to the left, as in. It raises price and reduces quantity. An important distinction between quotas and tariffs is that quotas do not increase costs to foreign producers; tariffs do. In the short run, a tariff will reduce the profits of foreign exporters of a good or service. A quota, however, raises price but not costs of production and thus may increase profits. Because the quota imposes a limit on quantity, any profits it creates in other countries will not induce the entry of new firms that ordinarily eliminates profits in perfect competition. Voluntary export restrictions are a form of trade barrier by which foreign firms agree to limit the quantity of goods exported to a particular country. Although such restrictions are called voluntary, they typically are agreed to only after pressure is applied by the country whose industries they protect. A voluntary export restriction works precisely like an ordinary quota. It raises prices for the domestic product and reduces the quantity consumed of the good or service affected by the quota. It can also increase the profits of the firms that agree to the quota because it raises the price they receive for their products. In addition to tariffs and quotas, measures such as safety standards, labeling requirements, pollution controls, and quality restrictions all may have the effect of restricting imports. Many restrictions aimed at protecting consumers in the domestic market create barriers as a purely unintended, and probably desirable, side effect. These standards tend to discourage the import of foreign goods, but their primary purpose appears to be to protect consumers from harmful chemicals, not to restrict trade. But other nontariff barriers seem to serve no purpose other than to keep foreign goods out. The conceptual justification for free trade is one of the oldest arguments in economics; there is no disputing the logic of the argument that free trade increases global production, worldwide consumption, and international efficiency. But critics stress that the argument is a theoretical one. In the real world, they say, there are several arguments that can be made to justify protectionist measures. One argument for trade barriers is that they serve as a kind of buffer to protect fledgling domestic industries. The desire to maintain existing jobs threatened by foreign competition is probably the single most important source of todays protectionist policies. Some industries that at one time had a comparative advantage are no longer among the worlds lowest-cost producers; they struggle to stay afloat. Cost cutting leads to layoffs, and layoffs lead to demands for protection. The model of international trade in perfect competition suggests that trade will threaten some industries. As countries specialize in activities in which they have a comparative advantage, sectors in which they do not have this advantage will shrink. Maintaining those sectors through trade barriers blocks a nation from enjoying the gains possible from free trade. A further difficulty with the use of trade barriers to shore up employment in a particular sector is that it can be an enormously expensive strategy. That shifts the supply curve slightly to the left, raising prices for countries consumers and reducing their consumer surplus. The loss to consumers is the cost per job saved. One reason often given for the perceived need to protect Indian workers against free international trade is that workers must be protected against cheap foreign labor. This is an extension of the job protection argument in the previous section. From a theoretical point of view, of course, if foreign countries can produce a good at lower cost than we can, it is in our collective interest to obtain it from them. But workers counter by saying that the low wages of foreign workers means that foreign workers are exploited. This objection, however, fails to recognize that differences in wage rates generally reflect differences in worker productivity. Further, we have seen that what matters for trade is comparative advantage, not comparative labor costs. When each nation specializes in goods and services in which it has a comparative advantage measured in the amounts of other goods and services given up to produce them then world production, and therefore world consumption, rises. By definition, each nation will have a comparative advantage in something. Exports restrictions are the limitations on the goods and services exported to foreign country by the government. These limitations are imposed to prevent a shortage of goods in the domestic market when it is more profitable to export. As a part of foreign policy for a example as a competent of trade sanctions. Government also promotes exports by making following incentives policies under EXIM policy like Duty Entitlement Passbook (DEPB), Export Promotion Capital Goods, Special Economic Zones (SEZ’s) etc.

Discussing the challenges faced by financial institutions in managing risk

Discussing the challenges faced by financial institutions in managing risk When discussing the challenges faced by financial institutions in managing risk, it is important to have a consistent definition of the term risk. Risk can be defined as the volatility of a corporations market value. Risk management involves the protection of a firms assets and profits. Moreover, not only does it provide profitability but also other advantages like being in line with obedience function toward the rule, increasing the firms reputation and opportunity to attract more customers in building their portfolio of fund resources. Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) suggest that the benefits of advances in risk management in banking may be greater credit availability, rather than reduced risk in the banking system (p.19). This means that banks will have a greater opportunity to increase their productive assets and profit. Only those banks that have efficient risk management system will survive in the market in the long run. They can follow a four-step routine to reduce their risk exp osures and achieve their risk management objectives, as shown below. Figure 1 steps for implementing risk management To properly manage risks, the bank must firstly identify and classify the sources from which risk may arise at both transaction and portfolio levels. Risks inherent in lending activities include market risk, liquidity risk, credit risk and operational risk. Market risk is the risk arising from adverse movements in the level or volatility of market prices of equities, interest rate instruments, currencies and commodities. Banks are always facing the risk of losses in on and off-balance-sheet positions arising from undesirable market movements. The fundamental role of banks in transforming of short-term deposits into long-term loans makes them inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk. The FSA has defined liquidity risk as: The risk that a firm, though solvent, either does not have sufficient financial resources available to enable it to meet its obligations as they fall due, or can secure them only at an excessive cost. Another risk that banks face is credit risk. It is the risk that can be incurred if the counterparty fails to meet its obligations in a timely manner. Loans are the most palpable source of credit risk in many of the banking systems; however, other sources of this risk originate through other activities of banks such as acceptances, trade financing, interbank transactions, financial futures, foreign exchange transactions, swaps, equities, options, bonds, and in the extension of commitments and guarantees, and the settlement of transactions. Operational risk, as its name suggests, is a risk arising from execution of a companys business functions. The Basel Committee has defined operational risk as: the risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or external events, such as the failure of computer systems or error and fraud on the part of staff. Apart from those risks mentioned above, the Federal Reserve System has recognised two other risks: legal risk and reputational risk. Legal risk is the risk of loss caused by sanctions or penalties originating from court disputes due to breach of contract and legal obligation. Another legal risk relates to regulatory risk, i.e., the risk of loss resulting from sanctions and penalties pronounced by a regulatory body. Reputational risk may be defined as the risk of loss caused by a negative impact on the market positioning of the bank. It can be seen as the blowing up of an initial loss, arising from credit, market, liquidity or operational risks. However, banks hardly pay attention to these categories of risks. Once identified, the risks should be evaluated to determine their impact on the companys profitability and capital. This entails measuring them by using various techniques ranging from simple to sophisticated ones. For example, market risk can be measured by using Value at Risk. This stage also calls for estimating three dimensions of each exposure: the potential frequency of losses that exposures have produced or may produce, the potential impact on the organisation if a loss should occur and the potential variation in losses that will occur during the exposure period. Accurate and timely measurement of risk is necessary because with these types of data the risk manager can determine which exposes are most serious and which deserve the most immediate attention. After measuring risk, bank managers should establish and communicate risk limits through policies, standards, and procedures that define responsibility and authority. In other words, these limits should serve as a means to control the risks associated with the banking institutions activities. There is a variety of mitigating tools that banks may employ to minimise the loss exposures. These tools may be diversification, securitization and even derivative such as withdrawal option, Bermudan-style return put option, return swap, return swaption and liquidity option. The final step involves appraising the operation of the program regularly to be sure that it is achieving planned results. It helps the managers to evaluate the wisdom of their decision-making. To efficiently monitor risk, all material risk exposures should be identified and measured again. To facilitate this procedure, banks should put in place an effective management information system (MIS) that will provide directors and senior managers with timely reports on the operating performance, financial condition and risk exposure of the firm. If corrective action is indicated at this stage, the first three steps should be repeated. 2.1 Corporate Governance in the banking sector Corporate governance is a term that is now universally invoked wherever business and finance are discussed. Its purpose is to coordinate a conflict of interest among all parties relationship within the company and to develop a system that can reduce or eliminate the agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control (OECD, 1997). Agency problem occurs when the agents of an organization (e.g. management) use their power to satisfy their own interests rather than those of the principals (e.g. shareholders). It may also refer to simple disagreement between agents and principals. For example, the board of directors may disagree with shareholders on how to best invest the companys assets, especially when it wishes to invest in securities that would favour their interests. Not merely does the term corporate governance carries different interpretations, its analysis also involves diverse disciplines and approaches. One of the most quoted definitions of corporate governance is the one given by Shleifer and Vishny (1997): corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assures themselves of getting a return on their investment. The Cadbury Report, however, defined corporate governance as the system by which companies are directed and controlled (para 2.5). Additionally, it recognised that a system of good governance allows the board of directors to be free to drive their companies forward, but exercise that freedom within a framework of effective accountability (para 1.1). The Hampel Report, whilst accepting the Cadbury definition of corporate governance, also noted that the single overriding objective of companies is the preservation and the greatest practical enhancement over time of their shareholders investment ( para 1.16). In a similar vein, Charkham (1994) identified two basic principles of corporate governance: That management must be able to drive the enterprise forward free from undue constraint caused by government interference, fear of litigation, or fear of displacement. That this freedom- to use managerial power or patronage- must be exercised with a framework of effective accountability. Nominal accountability is not enough. In the banking sector, however, corporate governance differs greatly with other economic sectors in terms of broader extent of claimants the banks assets and funds. In manufacturing corporations, the issue is to maximise the shareholders value but in banking, the risk involved for depositors assumes greater importance due to the fact that almost every bit of banks investment are financed by the depositors funds. If it goes bankrupt, it will be depositors savings that the bank will lose. Indeed, Macey and OHara (2001) states that a broader view of corporate governance should be adopted in the case of banking institutions, arguing that because of the peculiar contractual form of banking, corporate governance mechanisms for banks should encapsulate depositors as well as shareholders. Arun and Turner (2003) also support this argument. Further, the involvement of government in banking is discernibly higher compared to other economic sectors due to the larger interests of the public (Capri o and Levine, 2002; Levine, 2004). Rational depositors require some form of guarantee before depositing their wealth in banks. Yet, it is relatively difficult for banks to provide these guarantees to them because communicating the value of a banks loan portfolio is quite impossible and very costly to reveal. As a consequence of this asymmetric information problem, bank managers can have an incentive to invest in riskier assets than they promised they would ex ante. To assure depositors that they will not expropriate them, banks could make investments in brand-name or reputational capital (Klein, 1974; Gorton 1994; Demetz et al 1996; Bhattacharya et al 1998), but these schemes give depositors little confidence, especially when contracts have a finite nature and discount rates are sufficiently high (Hickson and Turner, 2003). The opaqueness of banks also makes it very costly for depositors to constrain managerial discretion through debt covenants (Capiro and Levine, 2002, p.2). As such, government interventions provide the lacking assurance to economic agents in the form of deposit insurance. Nevertheless, although the government provides deposit insurance, bank managers still have an incentive to opportunistically increase their risk-taking, but now it is mainly at the governments expense. Apart from supporting the argument that a broader approach to corporate governance should be adapted to banking institutions, Arun and Turner (2003) also argue that government intervention do restrain the behaviour of bank management. The Bank for International Settlements has defined the governance in banks as the methods and approaches used to manage banks through the board of directors and senior management which determine how to put the banks objectives, operation and protect the interests of shareholders and stakeholders with a commitment to act in accordance with existing laws and regulations and to achieve the protection of the interests of depositors. The Table 1 below shows the general principles concerning corporate governance issued by the Basel Committee specifically for bank boards and senior management. Principle 1 Board members should be qualified for their positions, have a clear understanding of their role in corporate governance and be able to exercise sound judgment about the affairs of the bank. Principle 2 The board of directors should approve and oversee the banks strategic objectives and corporate values that are communicated throughout the banking organisation. Principle 3 The board of directors should set and enforce clear lines of responsibility and accountability throughout the organisation. Principle 4 The board should ensure that there is appropriate oversight by senior management consistent with board policy. Principle 5 The board and senior management should effectively utilise the work conducted by the internal audit function, external auditors, and internal control functions. Principle 6 The board should ensure that compensation policies and practices are consistent with the banks corporate culture, long-term objectives and strategy, and control environment. Principle 7 The bank should be governed in a transparent manner. Principle 8 The board and senior management should understand the banks operational structure, including where the bank operates in jurisdictions, or through structures, that impede transparency (i.e. know-your-structure). Table 1- Principles of corporate governance for bank boards and senior management 2.2 Corporate Governance Mechanism According to agency theory, the corporate governance mechanisms reduce the agency problem between investors and management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Gillan, 2006). Traditionally, governance mechanisms can be classified as internal and external. Llewellyn and Sinha, (2000) states that internal corporate governance is about mechanism for the accountability, monitoring, and control of a firms management with respect to the use of resources and risk taking. The main internal monitoring mechanisms are the board of directors, the ownership structure of the firm and the internal control system (Gillan, 2006). Whereas, external corporate governance controls encompass the controls external stakeholders exercise over the organisation and its primary external mechanisms are the takeover market and the legal/regulatory system. However for the purpose of this paper, we will mainly focus on some internal corporate governance mechanism such as the board of directors, more precisely on its independence and financial knowledge. Corporate governance best practices have also stressed in particular the key role played by the audit committee in reviewing a firms internal control system. Internal control systems contribute to the protection of investors interests by providing reasonable assurance on the reliability of financial reporting, the effectiveness of operations and the compliance with laws and regulations (COSO, 1994; 2004). As such, we will also draw some attention on the importance of an audit committee. 2.3 The boards independence The popular media as well as corporate governance experts have characterised boards largely as rubber stamps for management. They are the link between the shareholders of the firm and the managers entrusted with undertaking the day-to-day operations of the organisation (Monks and Minow, 1995; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). As stated in principle 4 above, bank boards should properly supervise the work of managers. Which type of directors performs better this duty than independent director? In fact, such directors can bring additional experience as well as clarity of thought to deliberations independent of views of management. Moreover, since their careers are not tied to the firms CEO, outside directors are believed to be more powerful in keeping efficiently the firms top management (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983), and so could be associated with better performance. Some papers do support this theory. Baysinger and Butler (1985), being among the first studies, find that the relative independence of boards has a positive effect on the firms average return on equity by comparing 266 major US businesses over a ten-years period. Kesner (1987); Weisbach (1988); Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990); Peace and Zahra (1992); Ezzamel and Watson (1993); MacAvoy and Millstein (1999); Brown and Caylor (2004) and Ho (2005) also show that shareholder returns are enhanced by having a greater proportion of outside directors on the board. Research by Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994) shows significantly higher returns to firms announcing poison pills(rights issued to shareholders that are worthless unless triggered by a hostile acquisition attempt) when outside directors dominate the board. Other studies supporting the benefit of the boards independence are Dechow and Sloan (1996); Beasely (1996) and Klein (2002) who state that as outside membership on the board increase s the likelihood of financial statement fraud decreases. There is also Black et al. (2006) who reports that firms with 50% outside directors have approximately 40% higher share price by studying 515 Korean firms. And more recently, Staikouras C. K., Staikouras P. K. and Agoraki M. K. (2006) find that the percentage of independent directors is positively related with performance measured by Tobins Q on a sample of European banks. On the other hand, others find no convincing evidence that the level of outside directors on the board do add value to corporate performance. For instance, Fosberg (1989) finds that firms whose board is composed of a majority of outside directors do not have a higher performance as measured by the firms ROE or sales. Similarly, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find that non-executive directors have no impact on corporate performance in their sample of 142 NYSE firms. Pearce (1983) also find no relationship, as too Changanti et al. (1985) in their study of board composition and bankruptcy. The lack of relation between these two components has also been confirmed by Klein (1998), Bhagat and Black (2002) and Hayes, Mehran and Scott (2004). Other scholars refuting the effectiveness of outside directors on the board are Subrahmanyam et al. (1997) and Harford (2000) for the acquisition transactions, Core et al. (1999) for CEO compensation and Agrawal and Chadha (2005) for earnings restatements . It is normally the board of directors which overviews and approves the risk management policies. But, few papers have tried to link its independence to the firms risk management practices and hedging. By analysing a sample of bank holding companies, Whidbee and Wohar (1999) find that the likelihood of using derivatives seem to increase with the presence of external directors on the board but only when insiders hold a large proportion of the firms shares. Borokhovich et al. (2004) demonstrate that firms most active in hedging risk, especially when making use of interest rate derivatives usage, are those whose boards are dominated by external directors. Conversely, Dionne and Triki (2004); Mardsen and Prevost (2005) point out that outside directors has no impact on the firms risk management policy. Given the mixed empirical findings, it is quite difficult to assert whether the board independence contribute to corporate performance and the effectiveness of risk management. Although Fields and Keys (2003) assert that there is overwhelming support for independent directors providing superior monitoring and advisory functions to the firm, a unique and clear sign concerning the effect of the boards independence on any decision including the risk management one could not be predicted. 2.4 The financial knowledge of the board To adequately perform their supervision role, the board of directors must have financial knowledge (which relate to principle 1). Indeed, when board members are generalists and lack the technical financial knowledge to understand the complicated reports presented to them, they could vote for motions that increase the risks facing of the firm to a large extent. The company may collapse in this way and therefore hinder the shareholders interest. Because of the banks dominant position in the economy; they should possess some financial expertise directors on its board so as to make better decisions that will not lead the firm to go bankrupt. However, given its importance, the research on the value of the boards financial knowledge is quite scarce. At times, reports recognising the benefits of the boards independence also recommend financial literacy/expertise for directors in monitoring the firms performance. In fact, Booth and Deli (1999) and Guner, Malmendier and Tate (2004) suggest that commercial bankers on boards provide the financial skill needed to enable the business to contract more debt. Thus, this states that financial directors do add value to the firm. There is also Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) who provide evidence that positive abnormal returns associated with the addition of an outsider to the board are higher when the latter is an officer of a financial firm. Later on, Lee, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1999) do come to the same conclusion. However, they were unable to make any statistically difference among the reaction of the three categories of financial directors they consider: commercial bankers, insurance company officers and investment bankers. Moreover, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) discover that the probability of earnings restatement is lower in firms whose boards have accounting or financially knowledgeable independent directors. To the best of our knowledge, researches on the boards financial knowledge have only been related with the firms performance and not specifically on its impact on risk management practices. As mentioned earlier in this study, the board of directors is usually responsible for the firms risk management policies. In other words, risk management is at the core of any board members charter. Financially knowledgeable directors will obviously make better decisions on risk management practices since they will have the technical background to understand the sophisticated financial tools involved in the risk management transactions. As such, firms whose boards are composed of financially knowledgeable directors engage more actively in risk management. 2.5 The audit committee The audit committee is intended to provide a link between the board and the auditor independent of the companys management, which is responsible for the accounting system (IOD, 1995). The chief objectives of an audit committee are to improve the quality of financial reporting, to reduce the potential authority for the non-executive director, to improve the channel of communication with the external auditor and, perhaps most importantly, to review the adequacy of the companys financial control systems. Tricker (1984) defines audit committee as being an important vehicle for ensuring the supervision and accountability at board level. As such, audit committees are very important in banking to safeguard the shareholders interest as well as the public trust. Just as for the board of directors, independence is also considered important for audit committees because outside directors can exercise their voice and be seen to make a valuable contribution since they are free of any influence arising from the firms CEO. Thus, the reported empirical evidence supports this argument. Klein (2002) shows that independent audit committees reduce the likelihood of earnings management, thus improving transparency. In addition, Abbott, Park and Parker (2002) argue that firms with audit committees comprising entirely of independent directors are less likely to have fraudulent or misleading reporting. Ho (2005) states that there is a strong positive link between independent audit committee and corporate competitiveness and also with return on equity after analyzing the international companies from 1997to 1999. Brown and Caylor (2004) do provide evidence that audit committees comprising of independent directors are positively related to dividend but not to operating performance. On the other hand, some authors find a negative relationship or simply no relation at all between independent audit committee and the firms performance. Hayes, Mehran and Scott (2004) prove that the firms performance measured by the market to book ratio is not affected by the proportion of outside directors sitting on the audit committee. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) do come to the same conclusion by indicating that independent audit committee members are unrelated to earnings restatement. There are also Beasley (1996) who finds no apparent correlation between audit committees and financial statement fraud, and Klein (1998) who reports no relation between share prices and the audit committees composition. Yet, Carcello and Neal (2000) report a negative relationship between the probability of receiving a going-concern report and the proportion of outsiders on the audit committee. According to BÃ ©dard et al. (2004), each member of the audit committee should possess a certain level of financial competency. Moreover, corporate governance literatures argue that there should be at least one member of the audit committee with accounting background. Audit committees with such characteristics are expected to provide effective monitoring as they possess the skills needed to understand what is going on in the organisation. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) show that firms whose audit committees have an outside director with accounting background or financial knowledge are less likely to report earnings restatement while Abbott, Parker and Peters (2002) discover that the absence of a financially competent director on the audit committee is highly associated with an increased in financial misstatement and financial fraud. Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt (2003) find that the presence of investment bankers on the audit committee decreases discretionary accruals in a firm. Defond, Hann and Hu (2004) and Davidson et al. (2004) show that the market has a positive reaction following the appointment of directors with accounting /auditing experience on audit committees board. The audit committees are also responsible for evaluating the risk exposures and the measures taken to monitor and control these exposures. To our knowledge no paper has tried to link audit committees composition with risk management practices. Because of the mixed and conflicting argument on independence, it is difficult to attest whether audit committees independence encourage more corporate hedging. Risk evaluation and risk management tools are quite difficult to use. Understanding them requires a good grasp of mathematics and statistics. Therefore, we expect firms whose audit committees members are qualified as financial expert to engage more actively in risk management practices. Furthermore, The Cadbury Report has insisted that all listed companies should have an audit committee comprising of at least three members. This is to encourage firms to devote significant director resources to their audit committees so that audit committees monitor the firms management more efficiently. However, several studies support the idea that large boards can be dysfunctional. Larger audit committees may be plagued with free rider, communication problem and monitoring problems. Therefore, as long as the increase in the audit committees size does not pose these types of problems, firms complying with this requirement are expected to report a higher hedging ratio. Often, corporations, especially financial ones, create another committee named risk monitoring committees. These types of committee are often responsible of the risk monitoring of the firm. However, this does not imply that audit committees are no longer responsible for evaluating and managing risks. They must still discuss and evaluate risk management processes. In other words, audit committees are there to review risk management processes proposed by the risk monitoring committees. As such, same characteristics as audit committees should be applied to these types of committees to fulfil their duties well.

Marriage Essay -- Married Relationships Family Families Essays

Marriage What does marriage mean? By definition, marriage is â€Å"the legal union of a man and a woman as husband and wife† (Webster’s Dictionary). Most people claim that they want their marriage to last a lifetime. Because over half of all marriages in the United States end in a divorce, most people lack the understanding of what it takes to stay married. I believe that couples should become more aware of the commitment that they are making when they enter into marriage. Men and women should get to know one another completely before deciding to get married. Important issues such as religion, finances, career, and whether or not to have children should be discussed so that the couple can learn each other’s views regarding the issues to determine compatibility. For example, Br...

Culture Specific Syndrome

ultural Bound Syndromes Culture-bound syndrome The term culture-bound syndrome was included in the fourth version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) which also includes a list of the most common culture-bound conditions (DSM-IV: Appendix I). Included in DSM-IV-TR (4th. ed) the term cultural-bound syndrome denotes recurrent, locality-specific patterns of abnormal behavior and troubling experience that may or may not be linked to a particular DSM-IV-TR diagnostic category.Many of these patterns are naturally considered to be illnesses, or at least afflictions, and most have local names. Although presentations conforming to the major DSM-IV-TR categories can be found throughout the world, the particular symptoms, course, and social response are very often influenced by local cultural factors. In contrast, cultural-bound syndromes are generally limited to specific societies or culture areas and are localized, folk, diagno stic categories that frame coherent meanings for certain repetitive, patterned, and troubling sets of experiences and observations.In medicine, a culture-specific syndrome or culture-bound syndrome is a combination of psychiatric and somatic symptoms that are considered to be a recognizable disease only within a specific society or culture. There are no objective biochemical or structural alterations of body organs or functions, and the disease is not recognized in other cultures. While a substantial portion of mental disorders, in the way they are manifested and experienced, are at least partially conditioned by the culture in which they are found, some disorders are more culture-specific than others.The concept of culture-bound syndromes is very controversial and many psychologists, medical doctors, and anthropologists reject the concept. The identification of culture-specific syndromes: A culture-specific syndrome is characterized by: categorization as a disease in the culture (i . e. , not a voluntary behavior or false claim); widespread familiarity in the culture; complete lack of familiarity of the condition to people in other cultures; no objectively demonstrable biochemical or tissue abnormalities (symptoms); the condition is usually recognized and treated by the folk medicine of the culture.Some culture-specific syndromes involve somatic symptoms (pain or disturbed function of a body part), while others are purely behavioral. Some culture-bound syndromes appear with similar features in several cultures, but with locally-specific traits, such as penis panics. A culture-specific syndrome is not the same as a geographically localized disease with specific, identifiable, causal tissue abnormalities, such as kuru or sleeping sickness, or genetic conditions limited to certain populations.It is possible that a condition originally assumed to be a culture-bound behavioral syndrome is found to have a biological cause; from a medical perspective it would then be redefined into another nosological category. Western medical perspectives: An interesting aspect of culture-specific syndromes is the extent to which they are â€Å"real†. Characterizing them as â€Å"imaginary† is as inaccurate as characterizing them as â€Å"malingering†, but there is no clear way to understand them from a Western scientific perspective.Culture-specific syndromes shed light on how our mind decides that symptoms are connected and how a society defines a known â€Å"disease†. In contrast, culture-bound syndromes are generally limited to specific societies or culture areas and are localized, folk, diagnostic [comma sic] categories that frame coherent meanings for certain repetitive, patterned, and troubling sets of experiences and observations.Medical care of the condition is challenging and illustrates a truly fundamental but rarely discussed aspect of the physician-patient relationship: the need to negotiate a diagnosis that fits the wa y of looking at the body and its diseases of both parties. The physician may do any of the following: Share the way the patient sees the disorder, and offer the folk medicine treatment, recognize it as a culture-bound syndrome, but pretend to share the patient’s perspectives and offer the folk medicine reatment or a new improvised treatment, recognize it as a culture-bound syndrome but try to educate the patient into seeing the condition as the physician sees it. The problem with the first choice is that physicians who pride themselves on their knowledge of disease like to think they know the difference between culture-specific disorders and â€Å"organic† diseases. While the second choice may be the quickest and most comfortable choice, the physician must deliberately deceive the patient.Currently in Western culture this is considered one of the most unethical things a physician can do, whereas in other times and cultures deception with benevolent intent has been an a ccepted tool of treatment. The third choice is the most difficult and time-consuming to do without leaving the patient disappointed, insulted, or lacking confidence in the physician, and may leave both physician and patient haunted by doubts (â€Å"Maybe the condition is real. † or â€Å"Maybe this doctor doesn’t know what s/he is talking about. †).Root-work/Obeah: DSM IV-TR (2000), states that a set of cultural interpretations that ascribe illness to hexing, witchcraft, sorcery, or the evil influence of another person. Symptoms may include generalized anxiety and gastrointestinal complaints (e. g. , nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea), weakness, dizziness, the fear of being poisoned, and sometimes fear of being killed (voodoo death). DSM IV-TR site roots, spells, or hexes can be put or placed on other persons, causing a variety of emotional and psychological problems.The hexed person may even fear death until the root has been taken off, or eliminated usually throu gh the work of the root doctor (a healer in this tradition), who can also be called on to bewitch an enemy. Roots is found in the southern United States among both African-American and European American populations and in the Caribbean societies. Obeah (sometimes spelled â€Å"Obi†) is a term used in the West Indies to refer to folk magic, sorcery, and religious practices derived from Central African and West African origins. Obeah can either be a form of ‘dark' magic or ‘good' magic.As such, Obeah is similar to Palo, Voodoo, Santeria, root-work, and hoodoo. Obeah (another name used in the Caribbean society) is practiced in Suriname, Jamaica, Haiti, the Virgin Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Belize, the Bahamas, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Barbados and many other Caribbean countries. Obeah is associated with both benign and malign magic, charms, luck, and with mysticism in general. In some Caribbean nations Obeah refers to African diasporic folk reli gions; in other areas, Christians may include elements of Obeah in their religion.Obeah is often associated with the Spiritual Baptist church. Origins: In Jamaica, slaves from different areas of Africa were brought into contact, creating some conflicts between those who practiced varying African religions. Those of West African Ashanti descent, who called their priests â€Å"Myal men† (also spelled Mial men), used the Ashanti term â€Å"Obi† or â€Å"Obeah† — meaning â€Å"sorcery† — to describe the practices of slaves of Central African descent. Thus those who worked in a Congo form of folk religion were called â€Å"Obeah men† or â€Å"sorcerers. Obeah also came to mean any physical object, such as a talisman or charm that was used for evil magical purposes. However, despite its fearsome reputation, Obeah, like any other form of folk religion and folk magic, contains many traditions for healing, helping, and bringing about luck in love and money. Elements (key features/symptoms) According to Hughes, Simons &Wintrob, 1997 study, knowledge about a culture-bound syndrome, can address the relationship between the culture-bound syndrome and the more familiar psychiatric disorders, such as those in DSM-IV.These researchers call this the comorbidity question on the assumption that studying the culture-bound syndrome's patterned relationship to psychiatric diagnoses is a more fruitful approach than attempting prematurely to subsume it into the DSM diagnostic categories. Systematic research has identified strong correlations between culture-bound syndromes and criteria for psychiatric disorder, but there is rarely a one-to-one relationship between culture-bound syndrome and psychiatric disorder. The culture-bound syndromes often coexist with a range of psychiatric disorders, as many psychiatric disorders do with each other.The comorbidity question brings culture-bound syndrome research in line with current approaches in psychiatric research. Differences in the symptomatic, emotional, and contextual aspects of cultural syndromes, in turn, may signal different comorbid relationships with psychiatric diagnosis or even the lack of such a relationship. Opinion The extra ordinary addition of culture-bound syndromes in DSM-IV provides the opportunity for improving the need to study such syndromes and the chance for developing a research to study them.The growing ethnic and cultural diversity of the U. S. population presents a challenge to the mental health field to develop truly cross-cultural approaches to mental health research and services. This addition will give researchers the chance to study the relationship between culture-bound syndromes and psychiatric diagnoses. In my opinion a research program based on key questions is still unanswered, which is understanding culture-bound syndromes within their cultural context and to analyze the relationship between these syndromes and psychiatric disorde rs.Reference DSM -IV-TR Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (2000). Publication manual of the American Psychological Association (4th ed. ). Washington, DC: Author. Hughes CC, Simons RC, Wintrob RM: The â€Å"Culture-Bound Syndromes† and DSM-IV, in DSM-IV Sourcebook, vol 3. Edited by Widiger TA, Frances AJ, Pincus HA, Ross R, First MB, Davis W. Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Association, 1997, pp 991–1000 Retrieved July 29, 2009 from American Journal of Psychiatry.